ABSTRACT. The Battle of the Sexes game, which captures both coordination and conflict problems, has been applied to a wide range of situations. We show that, by reducing distributional conflict and enhancing coordination, (eventual) turn taking supported by a "turn taking with independent randomizations" strategy allows players to engage in intertemporal sharing of the gain from cooperation. Using this insight, we decompose the benefit from turn taking into conflict-mitigating and coordination-enhancing components. Our analysis suggests that an equilibrium measure of the "degree of intertemporal conflict" provides an intuitive way to understand the sources of welfare gain from turn taking in the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. We find that when this equilibrium measure is lower, players behave less aggressively and the welfare gain from turn taking is higher.
INTRODUCTION
Economists have used the Battle of the Sexes game to study a wide range of issues. Selected examples include entry into a market of natural monopoly (Dixit and Shapiro, 1986) and network externality (Besen and Farrell, 1994) . A modified version of this game has also been used to study the predictive power of forward induction (Cooper et al., 1993; Muller and Sadanand, 2003) . Table I illustrates a popular version of the Battle of the Sexes game. In this version of the game (with the standard assumption of h > l > 0), a couple wants to spend an evening together, but the wife (player 1) prefers to attend a ballet performance, while the husband (player 2) prefers to attend a football match. If they both go to see the ballet performance, the wife gets a payoff of h, and the husband gets l. If they both go to the football match, the husband gets h, and the wife gets l. If they choose different activities, each gets a (normalized) payoff of 0. There are both coordination and conflict elements in the Battle of the Sexes game (see, for example, Friedman, 1994, pp. 7-8; Camerer, 2003, p. 354) . While both players want to go out together, the conflict element is present because their preferred activities differ, and the coordination element is present because they may end up going to different events if communication between them is limited. Since players face the coordination and conflict problems, it is natural to expect that coordination failure (of ending up in one of the inefficient outcomes) will occur frequently in the absence of preplay communication. Laboratory studies of this game have in fact found that coordination failure is common. For example, Cooper et al. (1989) report that subjects mismatch 52% of the trials in a one-shot Battle of the Sexes game without preplay communication.
Would the players of the Battle of the Sexes game be able to avoid the inefficient outcomes if they interact repeatedly? In an early discussion of this game, Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 94) point out that if this game is played repeatedly, then even when no preplay communication is permitted, players can "signal to each other via their choice patterns on previous plays. Introspectively, we would suspect that, after some preliminary jockeying, the players would settle on a pattern of alternation between [the two efficient outcomes]." In the absence of preplay communication, it is reasonable to conjecture that players will go through some kind of costly "trial and error" process (corresponding to the "signal [ing] to each other via their choice patterns on previous plays" in the above quotation) to resolve the coordination and conflict problems that they face. This process is costly because, in resolving these problems, players may end up in one of the inefficient outcomes in some initial periods. As such coordination failure leads to welfare loss, the sooner the players succeed in getting onto a turn taking path, the higher their payoffs will be. Therefore, it is useful to develop an analysis that sheds light on the key factors affecting players' ability to resolve the coordination and conflict problems.
This article provides a formal analysis of the turn taking process envisaged by Luce and Raiffa (1957) for the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. We consider a strategy that we refer to as "turn taking with independent randomizations" (TTIR), in which players randomize independently in the initial periods of the game to determine endogenously when they will embark on the turn taking path (the coordination problem) as well as who will begin with the good turn (the conflict problem). The TTIR strategy is modified from Crawford and Haller (1990) , who consider the use of precedents as focal points in a pure coordination game.
The turn taking equilibrium we emphasize in this article is one in which alternation occurs most frequently (i.e., in the turn taking phase of the equilibrium path, a player takes the good turn in one period, the bad turn in the next, and so on), and we refer to this equilibrium as the "TTIR equilibrium." 1 We believe this type of "single-period alternation" is what Luce and Raiffa (1957) refer to in the above quotation and what turn taking means to most people. According to the Folk Theorem of repeated games, there are many possible subgame-perfect equilibria for this game, and the TTIR equilibrium is just one of them. We show that, among different subgame-perfect equilibria with "multiple-period alternation" (i.e., in the turn taking phase of the equilibrium path, a player takes the good turn in m consecutive periods, the bad turn in the next m consecutive periods, and so on), the TTIR equilibrium (with m = 1) gives the players the highest payoffs. 2 This result provides some theoretical justification for the observation that single-period alternation seems to possess focal-point features. 3 The key idea unifying our analysis is as follows. For the one-shot version of the Battle of the Sexes game, define θ = h l as the degree of conflict of the game. As several authors have argued, in the absence of communication, the logical prediction of this game is the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (see Dixit and Shapiro, 1986; Farrell, 1987) . At the mixed-strategy equilibrium, it can be shown that each of the two players chooses his preferred activity with a probability that depends on θ only (i.e., it depends only on the ratio of h and l but not on their individual values). It is clear that θ > 1, and thus, each player always chooses his preferred activity with a probability higher than 0.5 at the mixed-strategy equilibrium (see Section 4.1 for details). 4 In this game, a lower θ means that the surplus of the game (obtained when the players reach the efficient, instead of the inefficient, outcomes) is more evenly distributed, and thus the degree of conflict is lower. When the degree of conflict (θ) decreases, the stake in not reaching one's preferred outcome becomes relatively small. As a result, each player chooses his preferred activity with a lower probability, which is closer to 0.5, and his payoff at the mixed-strategy equilibrium increases. In summary, for a one-shot Battle of the Sexes game, a lower degree of conflict increases each player's equilibrium payoff, and this can be described as conflict-mitigating.
The above idea applies to one-shot Battle of the Sexes games with different degrees of conflict. We show that this idea can be generalized to a Battle of the Sexes game with the same parameters h and l (and thus the same θ), if repeated play is possible. Specifically, we show that the equilibrium "degree of intertemporal conflict" (in a sense to be made precise in Section 4.2) is lower than the exogenous degree of conflict in the stage game and that the discounted-average payoff of each player at the TTIR equilibrium is higher than his payoff at the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the stage game. By allowing the players to engage in intertemporal sharing of the gain from cooperation, turn taking reduces the distributional conflict and induces each player to behave less aggressively (by choosing his preferred activity with a probability closer to 0.5 at the randomization phase). The players' less aggressive behavior increases the probability that they will reach the efficient turn taking path in initial periods of the game and increases each player's payoff.
The same intuition also applies when we show that the TTIR equilibrium (with single-period alternation) offers players the highest payoff among all subgame-perfect equilibria with multiple-period alternation. More frequent alternation reduces distributional conflict and induces players to behave less aggressively. Thus, each player's equilibrium payoff is the highest under single-period alternation.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Battle of the Sexes game with symmetric players, and summarizes some well-known results when players interact once. Section 3 obtains the TTIR equilibrium of the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. Section 4 discusses the underlying reasons behind the benefit to players when they use the TTIR strategy, and proposes a way to decompose this benefit into conflict-mitigating and coordination-enhancing components. Section 5 considers the subgame-perfect equilibria with multiple-period alternation and shows that each player's equilibrium payoff decreases when turn taking occurs less frequently. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. Proofs of the propositions, which can be found in our earlier working paper (Lau and Mui, 2006) , are relegated to an Appendix available upon request.
ONE-SHOT INTERACTION IN THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME
We consider the Battle of the Sexes game between two symmetric players (players 1 and 2) with the following payoff structure: 
where T (which stands for Tough) and S (which stands for Soft) are the two possible actions for player i (i = 1, 2), and
is player i's payoff when player 1 chooses action x 1 and player 2 chooses action x 2 . This game is represented in the left-hand panel of Table II . Comparing this specification of the Battle of the Sexes game with the one illustrated in Table I , one notices that T represents choosing one's preferred activity (ballet for player 1 and football match for player 2), and S represents choosing the other player's preferred activity. 5 For analysis in later sections, it is helpful to introduce an alternative specification of the Battle of the Sexes game by defining
and
Parameter π , which is positive, can be interpreted as one half of the total surplus if either asymmetric efficient outcome (T, S) or (S, T ), rather than (T, T ) or (S, S), is reached. We shall hereafter refer to π as the surplus parameter. On the other hand, parameter θ is related to how the total surplus is distributed and can be interpreted as the degree of conflict of the game. It is clear that
A higher θ in the open interval (1, ∞) means that the surplus is more unevenly distributed, and thus the degree of conflict is higher. It is easy to see from (2) and (3) that
Using the specification based on the surplus and conflict parameters, the game in (1) can be represented in the righthand panel of Table II . Consider the game described above when the players interact once and choose their actions independently without preplay communication. It is easy to see that there are two (asymmetric) pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (T, S) and (S, T ). There is also a (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium. At this equilibrium, each player chooses Tough with probability q * ∈ (0, 1) to satisfy
Equivalently, q * satisfies
As a result, a player's payoff at the mixed-strategy equilibrium is given by
One advantage of the specification based on π and θ is that while a player's equilibrium payoff (U * ) depends on both parameters, his behavior (q * ) depends only on the conflict parameter (but not the surplus parameter). This specification is emphasized in the analysis in Section 4. On the other hand, the specification based on h and l is more convenient for some subsequent analyses. We use both specifications in this article.
THE TTIR EQUILIBRIUM IN THE REPEATED BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME
We now analyze the Battle of the Sexes game when two symmetric players interact repeatedly. We model the environment in which the players interact repeatedly as an infinite-horizon repeated game with discounting. Each of the two players makes a decision, simultaneously and independently, about whether to choose Tough or Soft (or to choose randomly between the two actions) in every period of the game. When making a new decision, say at period n, player i (i = 1, 2) maximizes the discounted average of the stream of his current and future stage-game payoffs (see, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) , which is given by
where δ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor, x ir x ir =T or S is the choice of player i at period r , and U i (x 1r , x 2r ) is the stage-game payoff of player i according to (1) . In order to capture the environment in Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 94) , we assume that there is no communication between players (such as the kind of nonbinding preplay communication considered in Farrell, 1987) and that there is no commonly observed variable on which players may condition their strategies and thereby correlate them (Aumann, 1974) . Crawford and Haller (1990) also make this assumption in analyzing a pure coordination game.
Analogous to considering the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game (in Section 2), we consider a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game in which players use the TTIR strategy. We refer to this equilibrium as the TTIR equilibrium.
The TTIR strategy specifies the following: (a) In the beginning period, the players independently randomize between Tough and Soft. Denote the probability of choosing Tough as p, where p ∈ (0, 1). 6 (b) As long as the randomization yields the symmetric outcome of either (T, T ) or (S, S), the randomization phase will continue. (c) Whenever randomization "succeeds" in getting players to the asymmetric outcome of either (T, S) or (S, T ), the game will switch to the turn taking phase in which each player chooses the action his opponent took in the previous period. If no player defects from this strategy, the turn taking phase will continue. (d) Any defection during the turn taking phase will trigger a switch to the punishment phase, in which each player uses the equilibrium mixed strategy of the stage game (i.e., each player chooses Tough with probability q * given by (7)) in each period. 7 We now examine whether the above TTIR strategy constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Define W H as a player's discounted-average payoff at a period in which he chooses Tough and the other player chooses Soft, with the expectation that players will choose the equilibrium TTIR strategy forever. Similarly, define W L as a player's discounted-average payoff at a period in which he chooses Soft and the other player chooses Tough, with the expectation that players will choose the equilibrium TTIR strategy forever. Finally, define W * as the value of the game, which is a player's discounted-average payoff at the initial period or any period in the randomization phase (such that both players' actions were the same in the previous period), with the expectation that players will choose the equilibrium TTIR strategy forever.
It is straightforward to show that for the Battle of the Sexes game the value functions at the turn taking phase are given by
In order to ensure that (9) and (10) are well defined, we need to verify that players will not deviate from the equilibrium strategy. Due to the stationary structure of the infinite-horizon repeated game, it is sufficient to check only two no-deviation conditions at the turn taking phase, one at the player's good turn when he is supposed to play Tough, and the other at the player's bad turn when he is supposed to play Soft. The no-deviation condition at a player's good turn (when the actions of the player and his opponent were Tough and Soft, respectively, in the previous period) is satisfied, because 8
Similarly, the no-deviation condition at a player's bad turn is satisfied, because
Now, examine the beginning of the game (or any period in the randomization phase). If both players use the equilibrium strategy in every period, it is easy to see that the game will remain in the randomization phase in the next period if and only if both players happen to choose the same action in the current period. As a result, the payoff matrix of the repeated game (when viewed at the beginning period) is given by Table III. For subsequent analysis, it is helpful to define
The function W ( p) represents a player's discounted-average payoff at the randomization phase when both players choose Tough with probability p, since this phase will continue with probability p 2 + (1 − p) 2 in the next period. Denote the equilibrium probability of choosing Tough in the randomization phase as p * . We hereafter refer to p * as the equilibrium randomization probability. When both players use the equilibrium mixed strategy in the randomization phase, it can be deduced from Table III that the value of the game W * and the equilibrium randomization probability p * are jointly determined by
Note that W * in (14) is related to the function W ( p) in (13) according to
In the TTIR equilibrium, a player chooses p * to make the other player indifferent between playing Tough and Soft. In Lau and Mui (2006) , it is shown that (14) leads to 9
Equation (15) can be interpreted as follows. A simple manipulation of the second equality of (14) shows that the equilibrium randomization probability p * in the current period is given by the middle term of (15), which involves W * , since the game may remain in the randomization phase in the next period. According to (A2) in Lau and Mui (2006) , a player's continuation payoff in the randomization phase, which is also equal to W * because of the stationary structure of the game, depends on (future) p * . Thus, one can think of p * on the lefthand side of (15) as the probability that both players choose Tough in the current period (at the randomization phase), and p * on the right-hand side as the probability that both players choose Tough in the future if the game remains in the randomization phase. The equilibrium condition (15)-which says that p * has to satisfy a fixed point requirement-can be regarded as a consistency condition between current and future randomization probabilities of this infinitely repeated game with discounting.
In summary, for the repeated Battle of the Sexes game, a TTIR equilibrium exists if there exists a p * ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies the equilibrium randomization condition (15). Moreover, the TTIR equilibrium is unique if there exists only one p * ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies this condition.
In Lau and Mui (2006) , we show that the TTIR equilibrium exists and is unique for the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. The result is summarized in the following Proposition. 10 PROPOSITION 1. For the infinitely repeated Battle of the Sexes game with discounting, there exists a unique value of p * ∈ (0, 1) such that the strategy profile in which both players adopt TTIR constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium for all discount factors δ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, the equilibrium value satisfies
and is given by
UNDERSTANDING THE WELFARE GAIN OF TURN TAKING IN THE REPEATED BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME
In the previous section we discuss how (eventual) turn taking can be supported by TTIR as a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. In this section we discuss complementary questions. For this game, what is the benefit of repeated interaction when players use the TTIR strategy? What are the underlying reasons for this welfare gain?
It turns out that an analysis of the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game with different degrees of conflict provides insights into the benefit of turn taking. Thus, we first focus on the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game in Section 4.1. We then return to the repeated game and examine players' equilibrium behavior and welfare, respectively, in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
One-shot Battle of the Sexes games with different degrees of conflict
In this sub-section, we consider one-shot Battle of the Sexes games with the same surplus parameter but different conflict parameters. We examine how a change in the conflict parameter affects players' behavior and welfare. First, we observe that in the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game, a player chooses Tough with probability q * according to (7) to make his opponent willing to randomize. From (4) and (7), we have
Since θ > 1, if a player chooses q * = 0.5, then the other player will strictly prefer playing Tough and will not be willing to randomize. In equilibrium, each player chooses q * > 0.5 to ensure that the other player is willing to randomize between Tough and Soft. Second, it can be shown from (7) that
When the degree of conflict increases, the stake in not reaching one's preferred outcome is relatively high. As a result, each player has to choose a higher value of q * to ensure that the other player is willing to randomize. In order to see how players' behavior affects their payoffs in the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game, we define
When both players choose Tough with probability q, each player's payoff is given by U (q). It is easy to see from (20) that U (q) is a quadratic function of q with the maximum at q = 0.5 and decreasing in either direction away from 0.5. That is, the slope function U (q) is positive in q ∈ (0, 0.5) and negative in q ∈ (0.5, 1). Third, U * in (8) is related to U (q) in (20) according to
Combining the above results, we obtain
The intuition of (21) is as follows. When the degree of conflict (θ) of the Battle of the Sexes game decreases, q * decreases in the range (0.5, 1) and becomes closer to (but is still higher than) 0.5, leading to a higher probability, 2q * (1 − q * ), of getting to the efficient outcome of either (T, S) or (S, T ). This change in players' behavior (q * ) leads to an increase in each player's payoff (U * ), because U (q * ) is negative when q * > 0.5. We represent these results in Figure 1 . The points are drawn for a given value of π (π = 100). At a particular θ (say, θ = 4) of the Battle of the Sexes game, point A represents (h, l) = Two observations can be obtained from Figure 1 . First, when θ decreases, lines O A and O B are rotated toward the 45-degree line (to O A and O B , respectively), because of (3). Second, when θ decreases, the player's payoff at the mixed-strategy equilibrium increases from OC to OC , according to (21).
Randomization probability at the turn taking equilibrium
In the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game, we see that a change in the degree of conflict (θ) affects players' behavior (q * ) and thus their payoff (U * ). We now examine how this insight can be extended to the TTIR equilibrium of the repeated game. In order to study the effect of repeated interaction in the Battle of the Sexes game, we consider a change in the discount factor (from 0 to a positive number less than 1) but no change in the conflict parameter.
In the following Proposition, we compare the probability of choosing Tough (q * ) at the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game with the probability of choosing Tough ( p * ) at the TTIR equilibrium of the repeated game. In order to make the other player willing to randomize during the randomization phase in the repeated game, a player chooses p * > 0.5 to ensure that the other player is indifferent between playing Tough and Soft. 11 PROPOSITION 2. The probability of choosing Tough ( p * ) at the TTIR equilibrium of the repeated Battle of the Sexes game is always lower than the probability of choosing Tough (q * ) at the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game. That is,
The proof of Proposition 2, given in Lau and Mui (2006) , is guided by a comparison of the distributional conflict between players at the one-shot game versus that at the repeated game. Note that if players of the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game reach an asymmetric efficient outcome, one player gets h, and the other gets l. If they fail to achieve an efficient outcome, each player gets zero. Therefore, the ratio of one player's larger gain from cooperation (h − 0) to the other player's smaller gain from cooperation (l − 0) is given by the degree of conflict in the stage game; that is, θ = h/l. According to (7) , the odds in favor of Tough (i.e., the probability ratio q * /(1 − q * )) at the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game is given by θ. 12 On the other hand, the odds in favor of Tough ( p * /(1 − p * )) at the randomization phase of the TTIR equilibrium are given by
which is obtained from the second equality of (14).
The middle term of (23) has an interpretation similar to (7) of the one-shot game. When players use the TTIR strategy in the repeated game, each player gets an expected payoff of δW * in the continuation subgame if they fail to reach an efficient outcome in a particular period. Therefore, W H − δW * is one player's larger gain from intertemporal cooperation (if they reach the turn taking path) and W L − δW * is the other player's smaller gain. The middle term of (23), which is the ratio of these two gains, can be interpreted as the degree of intertemporal conflict at the TTIR equilibrium of the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. We denote this term by θ R . 13 The intuition of Proposition 2 is that the equilibrium degree of intertemporal conflict of the repeated Battle of the Sexes game is less than the original degree of conflict of the oneshot game; that is, θ R < θ. In the turn taking equilibrium, even though a player is currently taking the bad turn while the other player takes the good one, the distributional conflict is less severe, since the first player knows that with repeated play he will take the good turn in the next period (and also periodically in other future periods). As a result of the less severe distributional conflict, p * is closer to 0.5 when compared to q * .
Conflict-mitigating and coordination-enhancing benefits of turn taking
According to Proposition 2, the probability of choosing Tough at the TTIR equilibrium of the repeated Battle of the Sexes game is lower than the probability of choosing Tough at the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game, because the (equilibrium) degree of intertemporal conflict is reduced by turn taking. In this sub-section, we examine how this change in behavior affects players' payoffs, and we provide a way to understand the welfare gain of turn taking in the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. We now compare each player's discounted-average payoff at the TTIR equilibrium of the repeated game (W * ) with his payoff at the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game (U * ). Using (13) and (20), the payoff differential can be decomposed as the sum of the following two terms:
The first component of the payoff differential can be understood as follows. If players do not engage in turn taking and just randomize with probability q * every period, each will get a discounted-average payoff equal to the mixedstrategy equilibrium payoff U * = 2q * (1 − q * ) π in the stage game, which can be denoted as U (q * ). On the other hand, if they randomize with probability p * every period, each will get a discounted-average payoff U ( p * ) = 2 p * (1 − p * ) π . Since 0.5 < p * < q * < 1 and U (q) < 0 for 0.5 < q < 1, we conclude that
The intuition of (25) is as follows. Recall that q * is determined by the degree of conflict (θ) of the stage game according to (7) , while p * is determined by the equilibrium degree of intertemporal conflict (θ R ) in the repeated game according to (23). We show in Proposition 2 that θ R < θ, and thus, 0.5 < p * < q * < 1. Since the function U (.) in (20) is decreasing when the probability of choosing Tough is between 0.5 and 1, each player's payoff when both randomize with p * each period is higher than the payoff each gets when both randomize with q * each period. As this increase in payoff is similar to that associated with a decrease in the degree of conflict in the one-shot game (see Figure 1) , we call this component of payoff increase associated with turn taking the conflict-mitigating benefit. Of course, in the TTIR equilibrium, players do not randomize with probability p * every period. According to the TTIR strategy, players will switch from the randomization phase to the turn taking phase when randomization leads to the asymmetric outcome of either (T, S) or (S, T ) in a particular period. Besides the conflict-mitigating benefit in (25), turn taking also delivers another benefit to players of the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. This benefit is given by the second term in the right-hand side of (24). It is easy to see that
In the repeated Battle of the Sexes game, if each of the two players uses the equilibrium TTIR strategy, then they will reach the efficient outcome of either (T, S) or (S, T ) after some initial periods of trial and error. Not surprisingly, a player's payoff at the TTIR equilibrium, W * = W ( p * ), is higher than U ( p * ), his payoff when both players do not engage in turn taking and simply randomize with probability p * each period. Since W ( p * ) − U ( p * ) is related to the fact that the TTIR strategy allows players to reach the efficient asymmetric outcomes even without preplay communication, we call it the coordination-enhancing benefit.
We summarize the benefits of turn taking in the repeated Battle of the Sexes game in the following Proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. Compared with the payoff at the mixedstrategy equilibrium in the one-shot Battle of the Sexes game, a player's discounted-average payoff at the TTIR equilibrium of the repeated game (with the same surplus and conflict parameters) is higher. Moreover, this payoff differential can be decomposed as the sum of the conflict-mitigating benefit and the coordination-enhancing benefit, according to (24).
The benefit of the TTIR equilibrium for the repeated Battle of the Sexes game can be illustrated graphically as follows. Figure 2 is drawn for a fixed value of π = 100. For easy comparison with Figure 1 , the payoff points A, B (and the origin) correspond to the game with θ = 4. As before, players' payoffs at the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game are given by point C. When repetition becomes relevant and δ increases from zero (to, say, 0.78125), players' equilibrium (80.84, 80.84) , are represented by point C δ . According to Proposition 3, W * > U * , and the payoff increase (W * − U * ) associated with turn taking is represented by the distance CC δ . Furthermore, this payoff increase can be decomposed as the sum of CC (the conflictmitigating benefit) and C C δ (the coordination-enhancing benefit). 14 
MULTIPLE-PERIOD ALTERNATION
In the TTIR equilibrium studied in earlier sections, alternation occurs every period (in the turn taking phase). In this section, we provide some justification for the TTIR equilibrium (with single-period alternation) by showing that players' welfare at this equilibrium is the highest among all symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria with multiple-period alternation.
As in Section 3, there is no preplay communication between players, and we consider a strategy that is similar to the TTIR strategy. In particular, there is a randomization phase in the beginning. The only difference is in step (c) of the TTIR strategy. For the multiple-period turn taking with independent randomizations (hereafter multiple-period TTIR) strategy considered in this section, we specify that, as long as the randomization yields the asymmetric efficient outcome of either (T, S) or (S, T ), the player who takes the good turn will continue to take the good turn for another m − 1 periods, where m is an integer larger than or equal to 1. Afterwards, the other player takes the good turn for m periods and so on.
Since the analysis in this section is quite similar to that in Section 3, we keep the presentation brief. Define W H m as a player's discounted-average payoff at the first period in which he chooses Tough and the other player chooses Soft, with the expectation that players will choose the equilibrium multipleperiod TTIR strategy in all future periods. Similarly, define W L m as a player's discounted-average payoff at the first period in which he chooses Soft and the other player chooses Tough, with the expectation that players will choose the equilibrium strategy forever. Finally, define W * m as a player's discountedaverage payoff at any period in the randomization phase, with the expectation that players will choose the equilibrium strategy forever.
With the same punishment strategy as in Section 3, it can be shown that the players will not deviate from the equilibrium strategy in the turn taking phase. Moreover, it is easy to see that
Denote the equilibrium probability of choosing Tough in the randomization phase as p * m . It can be shown that W * m and p * m are jointly determined by
In Lau and Mui (2006) 
The odds in favor of Tough (
at the randomization phase are given by the middle term in (31). Analogous to (7) and (23), we can interpret the middle term of (31)-the ratio of the two players' gains from intertemporal cooperation-as the equilibrium degree of intertemporal conflict (θ R m ) of the repeated Battle of the Sexes game when the players use the multiple-period TTIR strategy.
The key point of Proposition 4 is that the equilibrium degree of intertemporal conflict of the Battle of the Sexes game is different for turn taking of different length of alternation. Proposition 4(b) establishes that the equilibrium degree of intertemporal conflict is increasing in the length of alternation. When m increases, turn taking becomes less frequent, and thus the importance of being the first one to take the good turn increases. Therefore, an increase in the length of alternation induces each player to behave more aggressively in the randomization phase, and thus the equilibrium value of p * m increases and is further from 0.5. Furthermore, we show in Proposition 4(c) that players' more aggressive behavior increases the length of time it is expected to take to reach the turn taking path, which reduces the welfare of both players. As a result, W * m is decreasing in m. In summary, a TTIR strategy with a different length of alternation can be viewed as a different mechanism for the intertemporal sharing of gain from cooperation in the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. The above analysis suggests that the equilibrium degree of intertemporal conflict (θ R m ) of such a mechanism provides a parsimonious and intuitive way for understanding its efficacy in mitigating coordination and conflict problems. When an intertemporal gain-sharing mechanism is associated with a higher degree of intertemporal conflict, players behave more aggressively as a result of their efforts to capture a larger share of the intertemporal welfare gain. Consequently, this mechanism gives players a lower payoff compared to another mechanism associated with a lower degree of intertemporal conflict.
This insight is related to, and extends, an important finding in Bhaskar (2000) . In the context of the repeated Battle of the Sexes game and the repeated Hawk-and-Dove game, he compares the efficiency properties of two "conventions," where a convention is defined as "a rule which achieves asymmetric coordination by conditioning upon history" (Bhaskar, 2000, p. 250) . In that paper, the players also use independent randomizations to resolve the coordination problem. A "bourgeois" convention specifies that after an asymmetric outcome is reached as a result of randomization in some initial period, players will choose this particular outcome in all future periods. A convention is "egalitarian" if players' payoffs are equalized as much as possible. 15 The key point of Bhaskar's analysis is that different conventions give rise to different incentives for players' behavior in the randomization phase. Under the bourgeois convention, each player has a high stake in ensuring that coordination will be achieved in his preferred asymmetric outcome, and this causes players to place more weight on playing Tough in the randomization phase than they do under the egalitarian convention. As a result, coordination is less likely to be achieved in earlier periods under the bourgeois convention, and this convention is relatively less efficient.
The results in Bhaskar (2000) are closely related to the insight of our Proposition 4. Bhaskar's finding can be framed as saying that because the bourgeois convention involves a higher degree of intertemporal conflict than the egalitarian convention, it causes players to behave more aggressively and hence leads to lower welfare than the egalitarian convention. 16 Despite this similarity, there are major differences between this article and Bhaskar (2000) . Motivated by the discussion in Luce and Raiffa (1957) and the experimental evidence in Bornstein et al. (1997) , we consider the TTIR strategy that specifies periodic alternation between players once they embark on the turn taking path. The egalitarian convention considered by Bhaskar, on the other hand, involves the use of more complex time-varying strategies which equalizes players' payoffs (see footnote 15). Moreover, this article demonstrates the importance of the degree of conflict in the stage game and the equilibrium degree of intertemporal conflict in the repeated game in understanding the efficacy of different mechanisms in mitigating coordination and conflict problems. This insight, which to our knowledge has not been emphasized in the literature, provides a unified way of understanding the superiority of the egalitarian convention relative to the bourgeois convention in Bhaskar (2000) and the benefit from turn taking analyzed in this paper.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We conclude by discussing three issues: the possibility of alternative punishment, the efficiency loss in the TTIR equilibrium, and directions for future research.
In our specification of the TTIR strategy, we assume that defection during the turn taking phase will trigger the play of the static mixed-strategy equilibrium forever. As we now demonstrate, our results regarding the equilibrium randomization probability ( p * ) and the player's equilibrium payoff (W * ) continue to hold whenever an alternative punishment strategy prevents players from deviating from equilibrium behavior.
For example, consider a new TTIR strategy with an alternative punishment strategy that replaces step (d) in Section 3 with the following: Any defection during the turn taking phase will trigger a switch back to the randomization phase, and this randomization phase will continue until randomization succeeds in getting players to the asymmetric outcome of either (T, S) or (S, T ) again. 17 Provided that the no-deviation conditions during the turn taking phase are satisfied, it is easy to see that the analysis in the randomization phase is the same as in Section 3. In particular, p * and W * , which are related by (14) , are the same as before. From (A4) and (A5) of Lau and Mui (2006) , we conclude that the two no-deviation conditions of the TTIR strategy supported by this alternative punishment strategy are indeed satisfied. That is,
Consequently, we obtain the same behavioral and welfare implications characterized in our earlier discussion. More generally, it is easy to observe that whenever we consider an alternative punishment strategy that deters deviation during the turn taking phase, the analysis in the randomization phase is the same as in Section 3. Therefore, a specification of the TTIR strategy that involves any credible alternative punishment will generate the same behavioral and welfare implications.
Our analysis shows how turn taking can mitigate coordination and conflict problems in the repeated Battle of the Sexes game even in the absence of communication and devices to correlate randomization. In this context, players randomize independently in the initial periods to resolve the questions of how they reach the turn taking path and who takes the good turn first. While we find that there is a welfare gain associated with turn taking, we also discover that for some parameter combinations, the percentage of surplus attained is not close to the maximum, owing to initial randomizations; see, for example, Lau and Mui (2006, Table 6) . A natural direction for future research is to investigate how other complementary mechanisms such as cheap talk (see, for example, Farrell, 1987; Cooper et al., 1989; Farrell and Rabin, 1996) can further improve the welfare gain.
In this article, we focus on the Battle of the Sexes game, since this game has been widely applied and since Luce and Raiffa (1957) refer to it in relation to turn taking under repeated interaction. Another direction for research is to understand how the analysis presented here can generalize to other settings. For example, turn taking is observed in many situations in which common-pool resources, such as fishing spots, are assigned (Berkes, 1992) . Ostrom et al. (1994, pp. 58-61) suggest a "game of common-pool resource assignment" to capture a situation in which two fishermen independently decide to go to one of two fishing spots in their community. The good spot has a value of h, and the bad spot has a value of l, where h > l > 0. If the two choose different spots, each will obtain the respective value of the spot. If they choose the same spot, they will split the value of the spot equally.
The assignment game described above, which also features interesting coordination and conflict problems, differs from the Battle of the Sexes game. For example, in one version of the one-shot assignment game where the good fishing spot is "sufficiently more attractive" than the bad spot (i.e., h > 2l), there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium that involves both players going to the good spot. In Lau and Mui (2007) , we find that the TTIR equilibrium of this version of the repeated assignment game can only be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium if players are patient enough, unlike the repeated Battle of the Sexes game in which the TTIR equilibrium can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium for any discount factor. It will be interesting to study how turn taking can lead to conflict-mitigating and coordination-enhancing benefits in the game of common-pool resource assignment, as well as in other games.
